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Clerk, S'uprome Court. Utah 
Civil No. 8802 
IN THE SUPREME COURT ) . 
of the. 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNIE B. EVANS, as Administratrix 
of the Estate of William H. Evans, 
Otherwise Known as William Evans, 
Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
MORGAN EVANS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
DURHAM MORRIS 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IN THEI SUPREME, COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNIE B. EVANS, as Administratrix 
of the Estate of William H. Evans, 
Otherwise Known as William Evans, 
Deceased, 
Pla~ntiff and Respondent, Civil No. 8802 
-vs.-
MORGAN EVANS, 
Defendant and .Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts made 
by appellant regarding the issues in this case, with the 
exception that in addition to suing for an undivided one-
half interest in the cattle branded 44 referred to in the 
plaintiff's Complaint, plaintiff alleged in her Complaint 
that the defendant had on or about August 3, 1956, and 
after the date of the death of William H. Evans, wrong-
fully sold 8 head of cattle branded 44 without any au-
thority or consent of the plaintiff, or anyone representing 
the estate of William H. Evans, deceased, and that the 
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defendant had wrongfully had a check In the amount 
of approximately $806.00 given by the purchaser of said 
cattle in payment therefor, made payable to one Myrtle 
Littlefield, a sister of the defendant, and that defendant 
had wrongfully refused to account to the plaintiff for 
any part of the proceeds of the sale of said cattle; that 
the estate of William H. Evans, deceased, was the owner 
of an undivided one-half interest in and to said 8 head 
of cattle and was entitled to receive one-half of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of said cattle, and plaintiff further 
alleged upon information and belief that the defendant 
had since the date of the death of William H. Evans, 
deceased, wrongfully sold additional cattle branded 44, 
in which the estate of William H. Evans, deceased, owned 
an undivided one-half interest, and had wrongfully ap-
propriated to his own use the entire proceeds from the 
sales of said cattle, and had wrongfully refused to ac-
count to the plaintiff for one-half of the proceeds there-
of (Complaint Par. 5). Defendant in his Answer ad-
mitted that after the death of William H. Evans, de-
ceased, he sold cattle, and that he has controlled the 
distribution of funds received from said cattle, including 
$806.00 which defendant had paid to 1\fyrtle Littlefield, 
and admits he had refused to account to Annie B. Evans, 
Administratrix of the estate of Willia1n H. Evans, de-
ceased, for any part of the proceeds from the sale of said 
cattle; defendant further adn1itted that he had sold cattle 
without any authority or consent of the plaintiff, and 
denied that such sales "\vere "\Yrongful, by reason of the 
fact that defendant claimed to be the sole and exclusive 
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owner of said cattle sold. (Answer and Counter-Claim 
Par. 5). So that these were additional issues in the case. 
Respondent disagrees with the Statement of Facts 
made by appellant regarding the employment of counsel 
for the plaintiff in connection with the Evans-Page 
matter, and states the facts relating to said employment 
to be as follows: that counsel for plaintiff was employed 
by William H. Evans and Morgan Evans in about 1950, 
in connection with the enforcement of a claim held by 
them against D. G. Page and Verda Page for an alleged 
breach of a cattle Lease Agreement, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1, for an alleged failure on the part of D. G. Page and 
Verda Page to return to William H. Evans and Morgan 
Evans the cattle, which they agreed in said Lease to re-
turn to William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, Lessors, 
at the end of the term; that as a result of such employ-
ment a settlement was effected between William H. 
Evans and Morgan Evans, Lessors, and D. G. Page and 
Verda Page, Lessees, wherein D. G. Page and Verda 
Page executed a Promissory Note secured by a Real 
Estate Mortgage, to William H. Evans and Morgan 
Evans, for the sum of $4800.00, payable $600.00 per year, 
commencing December 27, 1950, with interest at 4% per 
annum, payable annually; said Promissory Note and 
Mortgage were left with said attorney for '.,bollection; 
that at the time of the commencement of this action all 
payments of principal and interest payable under said 
Note and Mortgage had been collected, and remittance 
made thereon to William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, 
less the agreed collection commission, on a 50-50 basis, 
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excepting the final payment of $600.00 principal, plus 
some interest, which had not become due on the Note 
and Mortgage at the time of the commencement of the 
action or at the time of trial. In said employment said 
attorney acted as attorney for both William H. Evans 
and Morgan Evans, in 1~onnection with a controversy 
in which William H. Evans and Morgan Evans were en-
gaged on one side, and D. G. Page and Verda Page were 
on the opposite side of the controversy. Respondent's 
counsel never at any time acted as attorney for Morgan 
Evans alone. (T. Page 10 to 13; T. Page 164 Line 17 to 
Page 167 Line 21; T. Page 161 Line 6 to Page 162 Line 
19). 
Respondent and her counsel deny and take excep-
tion to the statements made in appellant's brief and dur-
ing the trial of the action, to the effect that respondent's 
counsel was guilty of unethical and unprofessional con-
duct in producing, having identified and offering in evi-
dence, the Plaintiff's Exhibits hereinafter more particu-
larly referred to, which were objected to by appellant's 
counsel, and in a~:ccusing plaintiff's counsel of wrongfully 
revealing the secrets of his client (Appellant's Brief, 
Pages 4, 5, 6 and 7; T. Page 161). 
Respondent and her counsel take exception to the 
following statements set forth in Appellant's Brief per-
taining to the Honorable Trial Judge, before \Yhoin the 
case was tried: "The trial court on its own motion should 
have stopped the trial at that time and discharged the 
jury, and failing to do so has done irreparable dan1age 
to the defendant's substantive rights inasmuch as it 
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would now be impossible to retry this matter in Beaver 
County and that the volunteering of this information 
by counsel has now made plaintiff aware of same to 
where on a retrial same could be subpoened." (Appel-
lant's Brief Page 4). "However, the trial court was never 
able to see this matter and ruled as though the attorney 
had been subpoened into court with the information." 
(Appellant's Brief Page 5). "After a great deal of de-
liberation that undersigned cannot come forth with the 
thought that the trial judge, that heard this matter, in-
tentionally allowed this type of violation and disregard 
of the client's rights and all that an attorney holds 
sacred .... " (Appellant's Brief Pages 5 and 6). Re-
spondent contends that there is no odeasion or justifica-
tion for any such statem~nts or references being made 
concerning the Honorable Trial Judge who presided at 
the trial. 
STATEMENT OF RESPONDENT'S POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT 1 
Appellant has the burden of pointing out the error 
or errors upon which appellant relies, as error on the 
part of the trial court is never presumed, and in this case 
appellant has failed to point out any error or errors on 
the part of the trial court in ruling upon the admissi-
bility of evidence, or otherwise, which would require or 
justify a reversal or modification of the judgment of the 
trial court, and hence the judgment should be affirmed. 
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POINT 2 
If the Honorable Supreme Court is required to 
search the record on appeal in an effort to find any rul-
ing or rulings of the trial court which were erroneous or 
in an effort to find any failure of duty on the part of the 
trial judge, whlch would require a reversal or modifica-
tion of the judgment of the trial court, which respondent 
denies, and if the entire record is so searched, then· no 
error or errors on the part of the Honorable Trial Judge 
can be found which would require or justify a reversal 
or modification of the judgment. Respondent contends 
that Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 24, 25, 26, 27, 37 and 39, ob-
jected to by appellant's counsel on the ground that they 
are "privileged communications," are not "privileged 
communications" as between Morgan Evans and William 
H. Evans, or between Morgan Evans and the plaintiff 
administratrix of· the estate of William H. Evans, de-
ceased,- or b.etween them, or either of them, and their joint 
or common·eouns-el, and being non-privileged communica-
tions. it wa·s not unethlfcal or improper for counsel for 
the respondents to produce said Exhibits, to have them 
identified and· to' offer· them in evidence in behalf of the 
plaintiff, the personal representatives of \Villiam H. 
Evans,- deeea'sed, and· that said Exhibits were properly 
admitted in evidence, for the follo" ... ing reasons: 
A: Said Plaintiff's Exhibits, objected to on the 
ground that they are privileged communications, show 
on their face and by their context that they contained 
nothing of a confidential nature as between William H. 
Evans and Morgan Evans. There are no secrets or con-
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fidential information contained in any of these instru-
ments, which their joint or common counsel was·expected 
to keep from the other. In f31ct said Plaintiff's Exhibits 
show on their face that they were intended to be the 
common property of both, and that the contents of said 
documents were intended to be communicated to both. 
Being non-privileged communications, either party had 
a right to use such documents in a suit brought by one 
against the other, or their personal representatives, pro-
viding they are material to the issues presented. 
B: Said Plaintiff's E·xhibits, objected to on the 
ground that they were privileged communications, were 
either placed with or communicated to counsel for re-
spondent while he was employed as joint or common 
counsel for both William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, 
in a controversy in which William H. Evans and Morgan 
Evans were parties on one side, and D. G. Page and 
Verda Page were parties on the other side of the contro-
versy, and such documents left with or communicated 
to their common counsel are not privileged communica-
tions as between such joint litigants, or between them and 
their joint or common counsel, and such documents may 
properly be used in evidence by or in behalf of either 
party in a suit between themselves, or their personal 
representatives. 
POINT 3 
The witness J. Pratt Allred was subpoenaed into 
court and required to bring with him and to identify 
documents which proved facts beyond facts admitted in 
the pleading, namely, documents which assisted in prov-
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ing the joint ownership of the cattle in dispute by Wil-
liam H. Evans and Morgan Evans, and hence he was a 
necessary witness for the plaintiff, and defendant's ob-
jection to the cost item of $6.00 witness fee and $12.00 
mileage for this witness was properly overruled and 
denied. 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF POINT 1 
PALFREYMAN v. BATES & ROGERS CONST. 
CO. et al. 158 P. 2d 132,-108 Utah 142. 
2. Judgment of a trial court is presump-
tively correct and every reasonable intendment 
must be indulged in favor of it, and burden of 
affirmatively showing ·error is on the party com-
plaining thereof. 
3. Reviewing court does not look with favor 
upon the cause of a litigant who raises points and 
casts them in the lap of the court for research and 
determination, and, if this is done, it is within 
discretion of the court to refuse to consider them. 
BURTON v. ZIONS COOPERATIVE ~IERCAN­
TILE INSTITUTION, 249 P. 2d 514, 122 Utah 
360. 
6. Judgment of trial court is presumptively 
correct, and every reasonable intendment must be 
indulged in favor of it, and burden of affirma-
tively showing error is on party co1nplaining 
thereof. 
REID et al. v. ANDERSON et al., 211 P. 2d 206, 
116 Utah 455. 
8. Appellant's counsel, asserting trial court's 
error, has burden of showing error, and Su-
preme Court has no duty to search record for 
error. 
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STARTIN v. MADSEN, 2·37 P. 2d 834, 120 Utah 
631. 
7. To entitle an appellant to prevail, he must 
show both error and prejudice, that is, that his 
substantial rights are affected and that there is 
at least a fair likelihood that the result would 
have been different. 
COOMBS v. PERRY, 275 P. 2d 680, 2 Utah 2d 
381. 
On appeal, judgment and proceedings in the 
lower court are presum.ed to be correct and bur-
den is upon appellant to show error. 
LAWRENCE v. BAMBERGER R. CO., 282 P. 2d 
335, 3 Utah 2d 247. 
Every reasonable intendment ought to be in-
dulged in favor of validity and correctness of 
judgment under review, and it will not be dis-
turbed unless appellant meets his burden of af-
firmatively showing error. 
For other Utah cases to the same effect see: 
Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P. 2d 100, 106 Utah 428; 
Tatsuno v. Kasai, 259 P. 318, 70 Utah 203; 
Bush v. Bush, 184 P. 823, 55 Utah 237; 
Murray v. Finlayson, et al., 273 P. 319, 73 Utah 
232. 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
POINT 2-A 
PEOPLE v. HALL, 130 P. 2d 733, California 
1942. 
14. To be "privileged" the communication 
between an attorney and client must be confiden-
tial and so regarded at least by the client at the 
time, and if it clearly appears that the communica-
tion was not intended by the client to be con-
fidentia,_, it was not privileged. 
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17. Where attorney represented two differ-
ent clients~ attorney's letter to one of them de-
manding an accounting for the other client was 
not a "confidential communication" between at-
torney and addressee, neither was a letter writ-
ten by addressee to attorney and the other client. 
RAMSEY et ux v. MADING et ux., 217 P. 2d 1041, 
Washington 1950. 
5. Only those communications between attor-
ney and client which are intended to be confiden-
tial are protected by statutory privilege. 
ANDERSON v. THOMAS, 159 P. 2d 142, 108 
Utah 252. 
11. No express request for secrecy is neces-
sary to make communications between attorney 
and client confidential, but such relationship alone 
does not raise presumption of confidentiality, and 
the circumstances must indicate whether, by im-
plication, the communication was of a sort in-
tended to be confidential. Utah Code 1943, 104-
49-3 (2'). 
CLYNE et al v. BROCK, et al., 188 P. 2d 263, 
California 1947. 
9. Where persons have mutually employed 
same counsel and have discussed freely their 
problems in presence of one another and their 
counsel, reason for rule of privilege has been de-
stroyed, since each party by such concerted action 
thereby has waived right to place such communi-
cations under shield of privilege. 
PARNACHER et al. v. MOUNT, 248 P. 2d 1021, 
Oklahoma 1952. 
5. The statutory rule that attorney is in-
competent to testify concerning communications 
made to him by client in such relation is inappli-
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cable to such communications openly made in third 
persons' presence, but communications,· to enjoy 
protection of statute, must be made in confidence 
of relation and under circumstances implying that 
they should ever remain secret. · 
HILL v. HILL, 107 P. 2d 597, Colorado ~940. 
3. Communications made to an attorney by 
client for purpose of being conveyed by attorney 
to others are not "privileged communications'' 
within contemplation by statute concerning testi-
mony of attorneys as to communications by clients. 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF· 
POINT 2-B 
CUMMINGS v. SHERMAN, et al., 132 P. 2d 998, 
Washington 1943. 
6. Generally, where two or more clients em-
ploy the same attorney in the same matter, com-
munications made by them in relation thereto are 
not "privileged communications" inter sese, since 
by selecting the same attorney each party "waives'' 
his right to place those communications under the 
shield of professional confidence. 
Language of the Court: ( 6) The general rule 
is stated in 28 R.C.L. 566, Sec. 156, as follows: 
"When two or more clients employ the same attor-
ney in the same matter, communications made by 
them in relation thereto are not privileged inter 
sese. By selecting the same attorney, each party 
waives his right to place those communications 
under the shield of professional confidence. The 
reason assigned for the rule is that, as between 
the clients, communications made for the mutual 
benefit of all, lack the element of confidentiality 
which is the basis of privileged communications. 
Ordinarily the attorney for both parties is not the 
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depositary of ·confidential communications from 
either party which ought to be withheld from the 
other .... " 
CROCE v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 
68 P. 2d 369, c·alifornia 1937. 
2. When two or more clients employ the 
same attorney in the same business, communica-
tions made by them in relation to such business 
are not privileged inter sese, and such communica-
tions are not privileged as between any one of the 
parties and the attorney. 
Language of the Court: (2) But it appears 
to be well settled, as stated in Thornton on Attor-
neys at Law (vol. 1, p. 183), that: "When two or 
more clients employ the same attorney in the same 
business, communications made by them in rela-
tion to such business are not privileged inter sese; 
nor are such communications privileged as be-
tween any one of the parties and the attorney. It 
is the secrets of the client which affect his right 
that the law does not permit the attorney to di-
vulge. By selecting the same attorney, and mak-
ing their co~munications in the presence of each 
other, each party '"'aives his right to place those 
communications under the shield of professional 
confidence." (Citing many cases) ... Therefore, 
in the present case the eonnnunieations made by 
parties united in a con11non interest to their joint 
or common counsel, ,,~hile privileged against 
strangers~ are not priYileged as bet,Yeen such 
parties nor as bet,veen their counsel and any of 
the1n, '\vhen later they assu1ne adverse positions. 
JONES ON EVIDENCE \Tol. 3, Sec. 754, at Page 
1362: 
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Where several persons have employed the 
same attorney to act for them, their communica-
tions to him are not ordinarily privileged inter 
sese. 
58 Am. Jur. Sec. 496, Page 277: 
Sec. 496. - Suits between Clients or Consult-
ants. - When two or more persons employ or con-
sult the same attorney in the same matter, com-
munications made by them in relation thereto are 
not privileged inter sese. By selecting the same 
attorney, each party waives his right to place 
those communications under the shield of profes-
sional confidence. Either party may introduce 
testimony concerning the same as against the 
other, or his heirs or representatives. The reason 
assigned for the rule is that, as between clients, 
communications made for the mutual benefit of 
all lack the element of confidentiality which is the 
basis of privileged communications. 
To the same effect see: 97 C.J.S. Witnesses 281, 
page 795. 
ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF POINT 1 
As shown by the authorities above cited in support 
of Point 1, the appellant has the burden of affirmatively 
showing error on the part of the trial judge, and if appel-
lant fails to do so the judgment should be affirmed. The 
appellate court is not required to search the record on 
appeal in an attempt to find error. Yet in this case ap-
pellant's counsel has failed to point out any ruling or 
rulings of the trial court on the admission of evidence, 
or otherwise, which appellant contends are erroneous. 
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~ppellant's counsel has raised no objection to any of the 
rulings of the trial court on the admissibility of some 46 
'Exhibits which plaintiff offered, and which were received 
in evidence, and has raised no objection on this appeal 
to any other ruling of the trial judge. Appellant's counsel 
has raised no objection to sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the 
trial court. On the upper half of Page 5 of Appellant's 
Brief, appellant's counsel refers to approximately 113 
pages of the transcript, and . doubtless desires that the 
appellate court search these pages in an effort to find 
some error on the part of the trial court. Appellant's 
counsel states after referring to said extensive portions 
of the transcript, "Objections were made at various 
places on the basis of an existing attorney and client 
relationship." But appellant's counsel does not allege 
or point out any claimed error on the part of the trial 
judge in ruling on the admissibility of the documents 
objected to. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF POINT 2 
If the Honorable Supreme Court is required to pass 
on the admissibility of Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 24, 25, 26, 
27, 37 and 39, objected to on the ground that they were 
"privileged communications," then the court must con-
clude that said Plaintiff's Exhibits were not "privileged 
communications" FIRST because said Exhibits show 
on their face and by their context that they contained 
nothing of a confidential nature between William H. 
Evans and Morgan Evans, and SECOND that such com-
munications were either placed with or communicated to 
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the common counsel of William H. Evans and Morgan 
Evans, and as such were not privileged communications 
between them, or between either of them and their joint 
or common counsel. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, objected to on the ground that 
it is a privileged communication, is a Lease of 33 head of 
cattle, being a part of the Evans' herd branded 44, made 
and entered into between William H. Evans and Morgan 
Evans, Lessors, and D. G. Page and Verda Page, Lessees. 
The Lease is signed by all parties to the Lease. Certainly 
this Lease is the common property of William H. Evans 
and Morgan Evans, or their personal representatives. 
The instrument contains no secrets or confidential in-
formation to be withheld from any party to the Lease, 
and is not a privileged communication between William 
H. Evans and Morgan Evans, or between them, or either 
of them, arid their joint or common counsel who was em-
ployed in connection with the enforcement ·of the Lease.· 
Appellant's counsel, in making an objection to the admis~· 
sion of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 in evidence, accused respond-
ent's counsel of "highly improper and highly unethical" 
conduct in producing and offering this Exhibit in evi-
dence. (T. page 161, Lines 9 to 17). Such accusations. 
were absolutely false and groundless. The Lease objected· 
to was so clearly admissible in evidence to aid in estab-
lishing the joint ownership by William H. Evans and 
Morgan Evans of the cattle branded 44 that this was 
beyond argument. The document did not bear any re-
semblance of a privileged communication between Wil-
liam H. Evans and Morgan Evans, or between either of 
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them, and their joint or common counsel. It was neither 
unethical nor improper for respondent's counsel to pro-
duce this Lease, to have it identified and to offer it in 
evidence, and by making the wholly unwarranted per-
sonal attack above referred to upon respondent's counsel, 
was not appellant's counsel violating the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct of the Utah State Bar requiring that 
all personalities between counsel be scrupulously avoided, 
and requiring professional courtesy and respect be shown 
by one member of the bar to another (Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar Rule III, 
Sec. 17). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24, objected to on the same ground, 
is a letter dated Feb. 1, 1952, written by W. H. and Mor-
gan Evans to l\tforris & Matheson, Attorneys, of which 
firm counsel for respondent in the present action was 
then a member, regarding the Evans-Page item above 
referred to, in which it is stated among other things "as 
we have to buy hay for our cattle." This letter is in the 
handwriting of Morgan Evans and is signed W. H. and 
~{organ Evans. The letter shows on its face that it was 
written in behalf of both William H. Evans and Morgan 
Evans, and that said letter contains no confidential in-
formation as between William H. Evans and Morgan 
Evans, and hence it is not a privileged co1nmunication 
as between William H. Evans and ~forgan Evans and 
their joint or common counsel. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 25, objected to on the same 
ground, is a letter 'vritten by Morgan Evans regarding 
the Evans-Page matter above referred to, to the joint 
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or common counsel for William H. Evans and Morgan 
Evans, in which Morgan Evans stated among other 
things, "We have Record's to show where we had Regis-
tered Bulls with our cattle for over 20 years. You can 
call any cattle dealer and look at our cattle at Adamsville, 
and see the grade of cattle we have." This letter shows 
on its face that it was written by Morgan Evans for and 
in behalf of both Morgan Evans and William H. Evans, 
and shows that it contains no information of a confiden-
tial nature which was to be withheld by the common coun-
sel from either William H. Evans or Morgan Evans. 
Both William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, or their 
personal representatives, had a right to access to this 
letter, and to know the contents thereof at any time. Such 
letter is not a privileged communication as between Wil-
liam H. Evans and Morgan Evans, or between them, or 
either of them, and their common counsel. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 26, objected to on the same 
ground, is a letter written by Morgan Evans regarding 
ihe Evans-Page matter above referred to, to the joint 
or common counsel for William H. Evans and Morgan 
Evans in connection with said transaction regarding the 
division of the collections made by such joint counsel on 
the Note and Mortgage made by Gary Page and wife 
between William H. Evans and Morgan Evans (T. Page 
178, Lines 2 to 24). In this letter Morgan Evans wrote 
among other things, "While thinking it over probably best 
to let him have his 50 per cent, and you can send me my 
50% I will half to take a chance on the rest of his share 
of the expense money." This Exhibit contains no in-
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formation which was intended by the writer to be kept 
secret from William H. Evans, or his personal repre-
sentative. In fact the subject matter of the letter is such 
that it was intended as common information to both 
William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, and was in no way 
intended as containing privileged information as between 
William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, or between them 
or either of them, and their common counsel. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 27, objected to upon the same 
ground, is a letter dated January 12, 1954, written by 
Morgan Evans and W. H. Evans to Morris & Matheson, 
Attorneys, of which firm counsel for respondent in the 
present action was then a member, about the Evans-Page 
matter above referred to. This letter is signed Morgan 
and W. H. Evans, in the handwriting of Morgan Evans 
(T. Page 175). This letter shows on its face that it was 
intended to be the common property of both William H. 
Evans and Morgan Evans, and that it contains no secrets 
or confidential information intended to be withheld by 
their common counsel from either of them. This letter 
is not a privileged communication between William H~ 
Evans and Morgan Evans, or their personal representa-
tive, or between them or either of them and their common 
counsel. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 37, objected to upon the same 
ground, is a check made by Durham Morris, Trustee, to 
William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, dated February 
17, 1953, for $450.00, in connection with the Evans-Page 
matter above referred to. This check shows on its face 
that it was issued to William H. Evans and ~!organ 
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Evans, payees, and is endorsed by both of them. (T. 
Pages 225-228, and Pages 255-2·57). Certainly this is not 
a privileged communication as between William H. Evans 
and Morgan Evans, or as between them, or either of 
them, and their common counsel. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 39, objected to upon the same 
ground, is a check made by Durham Morris, Trustee, to 
William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, dated March 2, 
1954, for the sum of $450.00, in connection with the Evans-
Page matter above referred to, and was endorsed by both 
payees (T. Page 222, Lines 9 to 24). This Exhibit is 
in the same category as Plaintiff's Exhibit 37. 
The materiality of the Plaintiff's Exhibits above re-
ferred to, objected to upon the ground that they were 
privileged communications, is beyond argument. The de-
fendant and appellant, Morgan Evans, in his Answer de-
nied that William H. Evans owned any interest whatso-
ever at the time of his death in any cattle branded 44 
referred to in the Plaintiff's Complaint (Defendant's An-
swer and c·ounter-Claim, Par. 2), and the defendant testi-
fied at the trial that William H. Evans never at any time 
owned any interest in any cattle branded 44 (T. Page 354, 
Lines 7 to 12; T. Page 447, Lines 8 to 11; T. Page 447, 
Lines 8 to 11). The Plaintiff's Exhibits above referred to, 
objected to on the ground that they were privileged com-
munications, were offered in evidence, with other proofs, 
to establish the continuous undivided 50-50 ownership 
of the cattle branded 44 by William H. Evans and Mor-
gan Evans for many years prior to the date of the death 
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of William H. Evans, and to prove the absolute falsity 
of the testimony of Morgan Evans above referred to. 
Being non-privileged communications, and being ma-
terial evidence in support of respondent's claim of own-
ership of an undivided one-half interest in the cattle 
branded 44, it was not improper for respondent's counsel 
to produce, to have identified and to offer in evidence 
the Plaintiff's Exhibits above referred to, and the Honor-
able trial judge committed no error in admitting them 
in evidence and in submitting the case to the jury. It 
would most certainly have been an error on the part 
of the trial judge to have refused to submit the case to 
the jury. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF POINT 3 
Appellant's counsel has argued that because the de-
fendant and appellant admitted in his Answer and 
Counter - Claim that the defendant and the decedent, 
William H. Evans, were joint owners of the grazing per-
mits for 20 head of cattle referred to in the Plaintiff's 
Complaint, that J. Pratt Allred was an unnecessary 
witness, and the $6.00 witness fee and $12.00 mileage fee 
of said witness should have been disallowed. However, 
the witness J. Pratt Allred was subpoenaed to establish 
facts beyond the said admission in said pleading. The 
defendant and appellant had denied in his Answer and 
Counter-Claim that William H. Evans owned any interest 
in the cattle branded 44, and the witness J. Pratt Allred 
'vas subpoenaed and required to bring with him all ap-
plications for grazing permits filed by Willia1n H. Evans 
and/or Morgan Evans 'vith District Office of District 
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No. 3 Utah, Bureau of Land Management, covering the 
period from 1942, including the year 1956, and was re-
quired to also bring with him copies of all grazing per-
mits issued to William H. Evans and/or Morgan Evans 
during said period of time. Said witness did bring with 
him 7 applications for grazing permits, which stapled 
together were marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 32. These ap-
plications were the joint applications of W. H. and Mor-
~an Evans for permits to graze cattle on government 
land, covering the period of time from 1942 down to and 
including the year 1956. These instruments shows on 
their face that they were joint applications of William H. 
Evans and Morgan Evans over said entire number of 
years. The witness J. Pratt Allred also produced and 
identified 6 grazing permits, which were issued to W. H, 
and Morgan Evans to graze cattle on government land 
from the year 1942 down to and including the year 1956. 
These were stapled together and marked Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 31. These documents produced and identified by 
the witness J. Pratt Allred, and properly admitted in 
~vidence, were material evidence in establishing joint 
ownership by William H. Evans and Morgan Evans of 
cattle used in filling the permits, which ownership was a 
major issue in this case. If these men did not jointly 
own cattle, why did they over the years above mentioned 
jointly make application for, and jointly obtain permits to 
graze cattle on the public domain. The Exhibits produced 
and identified by the witness J. Pratt Allred were very 
material in establishing the joint ownership of the cattle 
branded 44, by William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, 
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during the pe~iods of time covered by these applications 
and grazing permits, including the year when William H. 
Evans died, namely, 1956. The Court properly over-
ruled and denied defendant and appellant's objections 
to the cost item above referred to. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant having failed to show any error on the 
part of the Honorable trial Judge in ruling upon the 
admissibility of evidence, or otherwise, which would re-
quire or justify the reversal or modification of the judg-
ment of the trial Court, the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DURHAM MORRIS 
Attorney for Respondent 
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